here suggest that rather than encouraging Asian Americans to retreat into ethnic enclaves, a sense of linked fate with other Asian Americans, membership in Asian American organizations, and even activism related to the politics in the home country may spur political participation in the United States, leading to more, not less, political integration for Asian Americans. These unique features provide new insight into a future of activity amidst diversity for Asian Americans in the decades to come.

5 Get Me to the Polls on Time

Coethnic Mobilization and Latino Turnout

Until recently, Latinos were nearly invisible on the national political scene, garnering little attention from political parties, candidates, and scholars alike. Much has changed in the last several decades, and Latinos are now the largest minority group in the country, making up more than 12 percent of the U.S. population. With a steady stream of immigrants from Mexico and Latin America, the proportion of Latinos is expected to more than double by mid-century to a quarter of the population. Once small and geographically concentrated in states in the American west and southwest, new patterns of settlement among immigrants to nontraditional gateway metropolitan areas in the United States has resulted in a highly diverse Latino population that is increasingly dispersed across states in the United States. Nevertheless, substantial populations of Latinos reside in five of the most electorally rich states in the United States—California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois—and the dynamics of elections in those states and across the nation simply cannot be understood without accounting for Latino voters (Leighley 2001; Shaw et al. 2000).

Despite the momentous demographic changes and the resulting imperative to understand Latino electoral behavior, surprisingly little is known about how Latino voters are mobilized, and what impact that mobilization has on their voting behavior. In general, political scientists have focused their attention on developing models to explain voting among Anglos and African Americans. Patterns of electoral participation by new groups of voters such as Latinos have been analyzed with the assumption that Latino turnout is shaped by the same factors that influence voting in these traditional models. But the unique experiences of Latinos in terms of discrimination, racialization, immigration, national origin, ethnic ties, and political context all lead us to expect that explaining Latino voting turnout requires going beyond the effects of demographic and political characteristics.
identified as central factors in traditional models of Anglo voting behavior. We focus on the significance of coethnic mobilization among Latinos, and investigate the extent to which ethnicity and the interaction of ethnic factors, as well as mobilization within particular political contexts and their impact on Latino turnout. Analysis of electoral behavior also must account for variation in the particular political contexts of states, and we emphasize the significance of structural and compositional differences between states with large Latino populations in our analysis.

DOES THE SHOE FIT: TRADITIONAL MODELS AND LATINO VOTING

There is a venerable tradition in studies of American voting behavior focusing on the individual characteristics of voters as the primary explanation for why people choose to vote. The most enduring of these findings is the propinquity of high social and economic status individuals to cast a ballot and participate in politics more generally (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). High-status individuals have more resources such as time, money, and skills that facilitate political activity. But as Verba and Nie (1972) show in their analysis of the importance of civic attitudes in explaining voting, individual level social and economic indicators alone cannot fully explain political participation. Also, Verba et al. (1995) highlight the significance of racial group membership for political participation, showing Anglos are far more likely to report being asked to participate than either African-Americans or Latinos. Another explanation of turnout focuses on voter mobilization, and acknowledges that although socioeconomic status remains the primary determinant of political mobilization, high-status individuals are also more likely to participate because they are more likely to be recruited (Verba et al., 1995). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue mass participation levels reflect the mobilizing activities of political elites and suggest much of the decline in voter turnout since the 1960s reflects changes in mobilization patterns.

The effect of individual resources and mobilization for voter turnout may be systematically different for Anglos than for African Americans and Latinos. Mobilization takes many different forms: among the most common in minority populations is through groups such as unions and ethnic institutions. These groups are especially salient for the mobilization of Latinos. Hero (1992) notes that various groups such as the League of United Latino Citizens (LULAC), Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SWVREP), farm workers unions, as well as local neighborhood associations played substantial roles in the Chicano movement of the 1970s. Tate (1993) and Gurin et al. (1989) find that even after accounting for resources and political attitudes, self-reported church membership and group membership has a positive effect on African American electoral turnout. Similarly, Diaz (1996) and de la Garza and Lu (1999) find reported memberships in voluntary groups or organizations among Latinos are also related to higher levels of voter registration and turnout. Nonetheless, despite mobilization's potential importance, most of the empirical evidence regarding how it affects African American and Latino voters is indirect. This is because the unit of analysis related to reaching out to voters from these groups is the mobilizing institution, whereas systematic data on the actual behavior of the individuals who are the targets of mobilizing campaigns is rare.

Verba et al. (1995) provide the most comprehensive approach to test the importance of group mobilization on minority participation among African Americans and Latinos. They suggest civic groups mobilize participation by directly asking individuals to vote and also by fostering skills that can be useful in political activity. They conclude that mobilization patterns are quite consistent across the three racial groups, including Anglos. Regardless of the form mobilization takes, after accounting for social and economic characteristics, African Americans and Latinos generally report being asked to participate at about the same rate as Anglos. How this affects turnout for Latinos as a group rather than as individuals is unclear because as a group, Latinos have relatively low levels of social and economic resources and status. Groups that are resource-poor are precisely the ones least likely to be mobilized to vote. In this regard, it is difficult to estimate how outreach influences the Latino vote overall.

Leighley (2001) addresses the political mobilization of racial and ethnic minorities by analyzing the relationship between group size and mobilization, and political empowerment and mobilization. As the size of a minority group increases, its potential for electoral influence also rises, and group size has an independent positive role on political participation. Political empowerment refers to increased political involvement by minorities as a result of having minorities elected to public office.

1 Once the resource differences are accounted for, Latinos and blacks are no less likely to be asked to participate than are Anglos. Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns targeting African Americans and Latinos differ in that African Americans are more likely to report being recruited in such campaigns targeting African Americans, whereas Latinos are more likely to report being contacted by Anglos (CITE).
Leighley's analysis demonstrates that although Latino empowerment does not stimulate higher voter turnout, Latino population size is a strong and significant predictor of turnout in both presidential and local elections as well as overall participation. Further evidence that Latino turnout may be influenced by group size is suggested by Uhlman's (1989) "relational goods" argument suggesting that increases in minority group participation are related to group interaction. In this regard, Latinos should be more likely to vote when they reside in homogenous ethnic environments as opposed to heterogeneous locales.

Although Leighley and Uhlman argue group concentration positively affects Latino participation, other researchers disagree. Empirical evidence from de la Garza and DeSpio (1997) suggests group size depresses mobilization, largely as a function of the fact that areas with high concentrations of Latinos typically include a large number of non-citizens who cannot vote. Political elites have little incentive to target these ethnic pockets, and group size does not predict greater mobilization efforts. Furthermore, de la Garza et al. (2002) find Latino voters in Harris County, Texas, who reside in precincts with a low density of Latinos participate at higher rates than those who live in high-density Latino precincts. This trend was consistent across elections between 1992 and 1998, and provides further evidence that residential concentration among Latinos does not increase voting turnout.

Taken together, the conventional wisdom regarding voting behavior, and Latino turnout in particular, addresses the significance of mobilization, but the findings remain inconclusive. Indeed, nearly all of the studies measure and address mobilization indirectly, focusing on environments that may or may not be conducive to mobilization campaigns. Individual level data measuring whether people have been directly contacted and encouraged to vote, and by whom, is rarely gathered. In the following section, we analyze the effects of such mobilization efforts with particular attention to the effects mobilization by coethnics has on Latino voting turnout.

LATINOS AND THE 2000 ELECTION

The rapid expansion of the Latino population in the United States, and its increasing diversity in terms of national origin, requires the development of creative strategies to study Latino mobilization in elections. Although the majority of Latinos across the United States have origins in Mexico, there is substantial variation across states with large Latino populations. For example, the majority of Latinos in Florida are of Cuban descent, whereas 50 percent of Latinos in New York are Puerto Rican. Alternatively, Latinos in California, Illinois, and Texas are overwhelmingly of Mexican origin. In order to capture this diversity and assess the impact of coethnic mobilization strategies on Latino voting turnout, we analyze data from a 2000 postelection survey of 2,011 Latinos citizens. Data from about four hundred respondents was collected in each of the five states of California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.

In Texas, eight out of ten Latinos identify their national origin as Mexican, and a slightly smaller proportion does so in California (79 percent) and Illinois (71 percent). Illinois has a relatively large Puerto Rican population (17 percent) compared with both California and Texas, which have a very small proportion of Puerto Ricans. In Texas and California, the second largest group in terms of national origin for Latinos is the category of "other," representing a range of Latin American countries such as Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ecuador. Florida and New York are quite distinct from their Western and Mid-Western counterparts, with relatively small populations of Mexicans—only 5 percent in Florida and an even smaller 2 percent in New York. In Florida, Cubans dominate, and are followed by Latinos with national origins from other Latin American countries. Twelve percent of Latinos in Florida are Puerto Rican. New York is unique in that it has a bare majority of Puerto Ricans as the largest Latino population, followed closely by 45 percent in the "other" category. In this case, representing large numbers of Latinos from the Dominican Republic as well as other Latin American countries.

In addition to the important variation in national origin among Latinos in the five states, Texas, California, Illinois, Florida, and New York, they also differ in terms of institutional characteristics and political context. We expect Latino mobilization to interact with the institutional characteristics of the state in which a respondent resides to affect voting turnout. Because each state varies in terms of the party structures, existence of political machines, competitiveness, union mobilization and other issues, which vary the efforts to mobilize Latinos within these diverse institutional structures, we expect the impact of coethnic mobilization to also vary across the states. Table 5.1 provides information on relevant characteristics of each of the five states in the TRPI survey.

2 The telephone survey was conducted by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) and the Public Policy Clinic in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. The total sample size is 2,011 Latino citizens. The sample has a margin of error of +/-3 points. Further details of the data collection are available at http://www.trpi.org.
TABLE 5.1. Characteristics of States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Characteristic</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Texas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>$39,595</td>
<td>$32,877</td>
<td>$41,179</td>
<td>$36,369</td>
<td>$34,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos in state legislature</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos in U.S. Congress</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness in presidential election</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Electoral College votes (2002)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive state races</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversial issues</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization by unions</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 includes information on median household income, the proportion of Latinos in the state legislature and the U.S. Congress, the degree of competitiveness in presidential elections, the number of Electoral College votes each state holds, whether state races are competitive, if there were controversial issues present during the 2000 campaign, and the extent to which there was mobilization by unions during the election. Each of these characteristics constrains as well as provides opportunities for mobilization among Latinos, and as a result, produces different stories of the 2000 election in each of the five states. According to the U.S. Census, Latino turnout increased in the 2000 general election to over five million, representing growth of 20.4 percent over the 1996 election, compared to an increase of 16.9 percent among nonvoting Latinos. This was the first time in decades that the increase in Latino voters exceeded the increase among Latino nonvoters. Additionally, their average growth rate in our five states was 27.5 percent, with Texas showing the greatest increase (30 percent) and California the smallest (25 percent).

California

California exhibited several of the key factors affecting Latino turnout, including competitive state races, mobilization by unions, and the perception that the state was a battleground state because of the “swing vote” potential of Latinos. Latinos make up 33 percent of the population of the state of California, and comprise 16 percent of registered voters. Although a substantial majority of Latinos in California are Democrats, George W. Bush and his campaign strategists believed they could inroads into this group. According to one observer, the Republican National Committee in January 2000 announced a multimillion-dollar bilingual ad campaign aimed at Latino voters that included “an unprecedented Latino-aimed television and print advertising campaign in California before the March 7 primary” (Marinucci 2000). Lionel Sosa, one of Bush’s campaign strategists went so far as to say “whoever wins the Hispanic vote in California will win the presidency. And make no mistake about it – we will win the Hispanic vote here” (Marinucci 2000). In addition to these primary efforts, in the final weeks of the campaign, Bush also spent an additional $8 million in California, with a considerable percentage of these funds devoted to Latino media (Novak 2000). Alternatively, Gore was more confident in his Hispanic base, and he limited his Latino-specific campaign to Spanish radio while failing to counter Bush’s television advertisements. Despite the minimal campaign effort, Gore successfully won 68 percent of all Latino votes, whereas Bush received 29 percent. Latino voters also contributed to Democratic congressional victories by playing pivotal roles in four of the five seats in which Democrats unseated Republicans.

Mobilization efforts by labor unions statewide also helped Latino turnout in California. The San Diego Labor/Neighbor program began in September of 2000 and conducted phone banking, neighborhood walks, and mailings every weekend before the election. Their primary target was the ten thousand union members in the San Diego area, many of whom were Latinos. A similar effort was implemented in the Los Angeles area by the AFL-CIO. They worked with Latino community-based organizations and Catholic parishes to get new citizens to vote. In Northern California, union efforts were undertaken by the Labor/Neighbor Program in San Francisco. This effort also began in September and was conducted in collaboration with the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, 2002). These efforts created high levels of Latino turnout relative to previous presidential races as well as compared to Latino turnout in other states. In addition, the median income among Latinos in California is also relatively high, second only to income levels for Latinos in Illinois. Taken together, these patterns suggest Latino turnout in California would be higher than that of the other states in our analysis.

1 See Rodrigo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio, eds. (2004), Mixed Voices: Latinos and the 2000 Election, Bowman and Littlefield for further details on Latino voters and the campaigns in the five states.
Florida

Although Miami’s Cuban American community constitutes less than five percent of the nation’s total Latino population, Cubans have been able to exert an inordinate amount of influence on national politics as a function of the competitive nature of elections in Florida. In the 2000 election, Florida was considered to be a “battleground state” despite the fact that Republican candidates have won the state in all elections since 1952 except 1964, 1976, and 1996.

Because it was considered a competitive state, both Bush and Gore campaigned heavily in Florida. Both candidates also targeted Latinos. Conventional wisdom predicted a decidedly pro-Republican base in Miami’s Cuban community, but Latinos with national origins other than Cuban were not similarly oriented. Bush’s dependence on Miami’s Cuban vote is partially a result of his unpopularity with the state’s other important minority constituencies, specifically African-Americans and Jews (Hill and Moreno, 2002). Thus, Bush poured significant resources into Miami’s Spanish language media and also ran an extensive campaign both on radio and television to mobilize his Cuban American base. In contrast, the Gore campaign concentrated on non-Cuban Latinos in Central Florida, which explains why almost all of Gore’s media time was purchased in the Tampa and Orlando markets. In addition to the funds spent on media, both Gore and Bush spent the last weekend of their presidential campaigns in Florida, with Bush ending his in a rally targeting Miami’s Cuban community and Gore targeting Jewish voters.

Despite the significant advances made by Clinton in gaining Cuban support, these efforts were reversed by the Clinton administration’s actions in the Elian Gonzalez case. Before this, Clinton was the first Democratic presidential candidate to campaign in Miami’s Cuban community, and although he received 25 percent of the Cuban vote in 1992, he increased his support among Miami Cubans to 40 percent by 1996. Many Cuban Americans were outraged by the administration’s decision to send Elian Gonzalez back to Cuba, and the 2000 election provided the opportunity to punish the Democratic candidate for the Clinton administration’s handling of the Elian Gonzalez case. This controversial issue served to both energize and mobilize Cuban voters who voted overwhelmingly for the Republican candidate.

In addition to the presidential contest, the mayoral race in Miami mobilized Latinos, particularly Cubans in Miami. Alex Penelas, Miami-Dade’s Cuban American Mayor, was running for reelection. Penelas was a highly visible and popular Latino leader in Florida, and a strong supporter of Clinton. In the wake of the Elian Gonzalez issue, Penelas remained critical of the Clinton administration in order to retain his base of Cuban voters. Penelas even went so far as to state that any violence resulting from the seizure of the boy would be the fault of the Clinton administration. This race not only mobilized the Cuban community to vote against the Democratic presidential candidate, but it also mobilized Cubans to support Penelas. Finally, despite their low median income, the fact that both parties targeted the Latinos and the saliency of the Elian Gonzalez issue angering the Cuban American voters suggested that Latino turnout would be quite high in Florida.

Texas

Although Gore promised to fight for this important Electoral College state, it was widely acknowledged that this commitment was mostly rhetorical. No significant appeals were made to Latinos in Texas by the Democrats. In a similar vein, Bush took Latino votes for granted in his home state, knowing he already had the support of the Texas electorate. Texas was not considered to be a competitive state, and in 2000, there were no other contested races on the ballot, nor were there any polarizing issues stimulating voter interest. Furthermore, Latinos in Texas have the lowest median income compared to the other four states. Thus, even though there is a solid bloc of Latino Democratic elected officials in the state who could have led a GOTV effort, there was no reason to expect high turnout among Latinos in the Lone Star State.

Illinois

As was the case in Texas, Illinois’ Latinos were not pivotal in the 2000 presidential election. In neither the primaries nor the general election did presidential candidates or political parties actively seek their votes. Illinois was not central to either candidate’s strategy, and the state was neglected by both parties until the last two weeks of the election. Gore’s safe margin of victory of 12 percent, and the fact that Illinois offered the smallest number of electoral votes compared to the other four states with the largest Latino populations, further explains the lack of attention that Latinos received in Illinois during the 2000 election.

Other structural conditions necessary to mobilize Latino turnout in Illinois also were noticeably absent, such as no competitive statewide or local races with Latino candidates; nor were there controversial issues that could mobilize Latinos in 2000. Although there were a number of contested congressional races, in only one was the Latino population larger.
than 5 percent. The Bush campaign did run some commercials in selected media markets after Labor Day, but the advertising lasted less than a month. Moreover, when it was clear Illinois had become noncompetitive, both campaigns removed their Latino campaign staffs in early September and transferred them to Wisconsin. These factors more than counterbalanced the state's high median Latino income and indicate why there were few reasons to expect high Latino turnout in Illinois.

New York

New York was not a competitive state in terms of Electoral College votes, and this is evident from Gore's 21 percent margin of victory in the state. Although Latino turnout may have been depressed because of this Democratic advantage, it was counterbalanced by the mobilization of Latino voters by strong union efforts, controversial issues directly affecting Latinos, and competitive statewide races. The largest union in the state, the health care union led by Dennis Rivera, facilitated high rates of Latino turnout because not only do Latinos comprise a substantial portion of its members, but also because Rivera is of Puerto Rican descent. These union efforts helped mobilize Latinos in New York and complemented the standard party or community based organizations' initiatives, producing a pattern not visible in Texas or Illinois.

A number of issues also mobilized New York Latinos, who are primarily comprised of Puerto Ricans. Similar to the effects of the Elian Gonzalez issue in Florida, actions taken by the Clinton administration regarding the island of Vieques had detrimental effects for Vice President Gore. The administration's decision to allow Navy bombing exercises on Vieques caused a great deal of resentment among the Puerto Rican community. This action, however, may have been counterbalanced by President Clinton's offer of clemency to sixteen Puerto Rican nationalists who had participated in the assaults on the U.S. House of Representatives in 1953. Regardless of whether these issues had a positive or negative effect on Gore, they motivated New York Latinos to go to the polls, either to punish Gore for the actions taken by the Clinton administration or to provide their traditional support for the Democratic candidate. Another factor fueling turnout in New York was the U.S. Senate race between Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio. Clinton's reliance on a strong Democratic turnout resulted in significant get-out-the-vote efforts in both black and Latino areas (Liff 2000). Such efforts further mobilized New York Latinos to vote, a phenomenon that was noticeably absent in both Illinois and Texas.

LATINO COETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN THE 2000 ELECTION

In this section, we test the effect of Latino outreach on Latino voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election in the five states of California, Texas, Illinois, Florida, and New York.

The five-state TRPI survey of Latino citizens included questions on presidential vote choice and issues for the 2000 elections, opinions on a variety of issues, level of political attentiveness and interest, questions on who asked the respondents to participate, as well as demographic information. To get an accurate record of Latino voting rates, we used official turnout records to validate self-reported turnout. Validating turnout was necessary in light of evidence from Shaw et al. (2000) revealing over-reporting among Latinos in their level of turnout during the 1996 presidential election at a rate of 20 percent.

In order to test our hypothesis regarding the effect that coethnic mobilization has on turnout, we designed three models incorporating various factors that impact voter turnout. We predict whether or not an individual voted in the 2000 presidential election, and in so doing, we use a binary logit model to estimate the influence of mobilization and other factors affecting voting behavior. In the first model, we do not take into account the differences that may exist between and within states, that is, we fit a complete pooling logit regression. In the second model, we let the intercept and the mobilization variables (slopes) vary by state in order to capture each state's structural intricacies as discussed previously. In the third and last model, we allow the mobilization and ethnicity variables to vary by state so we can gauge the interactions that may exist between ethnic groups and each state's institutional arrangements. Explanatory measures include demographic characteristics, political attitudes and behaviors, nonethnicity and coethnic mobilization efforts.

In our models, we include the standard socioeconomic variables known to influence turnout including age, income, education, and nativity. To those we add another set of indicators that political participation literature has suggested plays a positive role in voter turnout: these include partisanship, strength of political interest, and strength of party identification (Verba et al. 1995). We also include other factors that could potentially increase turnout such as whether one attends political meetings (Tate 1993; Gurin et al. 1989; Díaz 1996). In addition, we include measures of mobilization by any group or organization, contact by an ethnic group, and/or a political party. Because respondents were asked several questions regarding various types of mobilization, we created an overall mobilization
measure coded as “1” if the respondent was mobilized by a Latino (group, person, or organization), “2” if the respondent was mobilized by a non-Latino entity, and “3” if the respondent was mobilized by either a Latino or a non-Latino regardless of the type of group. The baseline category is whether the respondent was mobilized by a Latino regardless of the type of group responsible for the mobilizing campaign. Finally, ethnicity or national origin was coded as a categorical variable consisting of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and others.

State in this chapter is used as an aggregate indirect measure of a variety of factors that we group as Type I (exogenous) and Type II (endogenous) variables (Guerra and Fraga, 1996). Type I factors include variables that Latinos cannot control or directly influence in any given election, while the Type II factors include variables Latinos can control or directly influence. Type I factors include median family income, the presence of controversial issues either on the ballot or affecting the political climate at election time, state level partisan competitiveness, and the size of the state's electoral college vote. Type II factors are factors that Latinos can influence such as the extent of Latino representation within the state legislature, their percentage within the congressional delegation, and the extent to which Latinos initiated or implemented targeted Latino get-out-the-vote campaigns.

Figure 5.1 maps the direct mobilization model of how ethnic mobilization and other explanatory measures influence turnout.

However, the impact of ethnic mobilization and ethnicity on voter turnout may not be as direct as the path in Figure 5.1 specifies. Rather, mobilization can also be viewed in an alternative indirect manner, as shown in Figure 5.2. The decision to vote may be dependent on contact from a Latino, the state he or she comes from, and on the voter's ethnic group. Mobilization can occur based on ties to one's ethnic group as well as because of outreach by Latinos who are not coethnics. Likewise, when state institutions interact with mobilization by a Latino, they may affect an individual's decision to vote. We represent these indirect effects of mobilization by the dashed lines in Figure 5.2, and the arrows also indicate the causal path that can occur in either direction. In order to capture all the possible effects of mobilization, we include these interactive terms in the estimation of our model with interaction effects. The results from these estimates indicate whether indirect mobilization influences turnout.

Given that we are dealing with ethnic groups that have had a tenuous relationship with political institutions, these indirect effects may be more relevant to these sets of voters because they have not been traditionally targeted by mainstream campaigns, and mobilization may be more successful when implemented by a coethnic.

**Direct Effects of Ethnic Mobilization**

We first consider the direct effects of ethnic mobilization on the pooled sample of all Latinos in the five states. Table 5.2 presents the estimated coefficients from the direct mobilization model. In terms of the demographic factors, both age and income have positive but not significant effects on turnout among Latinos in the pooled national sample. The other traditional measures of individual social and economic status have a mixed influence on turnout: education, in particular, reveals no relationship to
one's likelihood of voting in the pooled national sample. Similarly, nativity is also non-significant, meaning that Latinos born in the United States were no more likely to vote than were immigrant Latinos, all else being equal. Being a Democrat is not a significant predictor of Latino voting in the 2000 election, however, those who identify as strong partisans and who express a strong interest in the campaign are also more likely to vote. Likewise, Latinos mobilized either by non-Latinos or by Latinos are also more likely to vote than those who are not personally encouraged to vote. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no turnout differences associated with national origin. In other words, the effect of national origin on turnout is not statistically significant.

When we turn to the estimation of the direct effects model by individual states, the results are almost identical regarding the sociodemographic and political variables. However, the impacts of our mobilization variables are somewhat different. Table 5.3 presents the state intercepts and the coefficients for our mobilization variables for California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. Most noteworthy is that the model indicates that no state effects have a statistically significant impact on mobilization (see Random Effects in Table 5.3).

**Indirect mobilization of Latino voters: Specifying interaction effects.** The results from the direct mobilization model estimated for individual states presents some contradictory findings, which lead us to estimate the impact...
of indirect mobilization of Latino voters. It is possible that there are interaction effects between coethnic mobilization and national origin, and that there are distinctive effects in specific states. To test this hypothesis, we allow ethnicity and our mobilization variables to vary by state. In addition, these models include all of the other measures specified in the direct mobilization models discussed earlier.

Overall, we find that the effect of mobilization increased from previous models and have a strong and significant effect on turnout among Latinos in the United States. Although the influences of the mobilization measures remain strong and robust, we need to test if the results support the argument that ethnic factors or interactive terms involving ethnicity and specific states stimulate turnout. In order to test the extent to which the institutional arrangements of individual states interact with ethnicity and coethnic mobilization, we estimated the indirect mobilization model allowing the mobilization variables and ethnicity to interact and vary by state. The effect of ethnicity and being contacted by both a Latino and a non-Latino is mixed. For instance, if a Cuban in Illinois was contacted by both a Latino and a non-Latino, she was less likely to vote. However, in Texas, we find the opposite effect. If one is Cuban and contacted by a Latino or non-Latino to vote, she was more likely to vote. Thus, although our empirical results from Texas support our hypothesis that certain ethnic groups are more responsive to mobilization efforts from either their own ethnic group or from individuals who share a panethnic identity with them, we are puzzled as to why Latino mobilization sometimes plays a negative role. Nonetheless, being contacted by a noncoethnic and/or by a coethnic Latino has a systematic effect on turnout among the Latino groups included in this study.

GETTING LATINOS TO THE POLLS

Our analysis reveals mobilization is an important predictor of turnout on a nationwide scale. These findings reaffirm the current participation literature that points to the importance of mobilization efforts to help increase voter turnout. More specifically, our findings demonstrate that Latinos who are asked to vote are more likely to vote. Another important insight from our analysis is the small amount of variation that exists across states regarding the factors that influence turnout for Latinos. Although different factors, from demographic characteristics to those concerning political attitudes and behavior, are more salient in turnout in some states that
Coethnic Mobilization and Latino Turnout

than ever these patterns indicate the need for further research because the questions we are asking concern how the nation’s largest minority population of Latinos will engage the polity. Such knowledge transcends pure scientific interests and instead highlights the importance these electoral dynamics will have on democratic representation and political equality in a nation of growing racial and ethnic diversity.